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ABSTRACT
This Article explores and evaluates a controversial practice that the Patent Office
undertook beginning early in the post-AIA regime: the practice of denying otherwise
meritorious requests for review because of what the Office termed "redundant" grounds. The
controversy over redundancy-based rejections had several sources. One was that making such
rejections required the Patent Office to decide petitions piecemeal-and, indeed, the agency
claimed that power for itself-even though it was not clear that this power lay within the
statute. Another source was that the Patent Office persistently declined to explain what, in the
agency's view, did or did not constitute redundancy. Still another was that the Patent Office
resisted Federal Circuit oversight of this practice by claiming unreviewable discretion as part
of a larger campaign of self-immunization. This confluence of problematic agency choices has
generated other, related controversies with AIA review as well, with a mixed record of success
for the Patent Office. Yet while redundancy-based rejection now seems to be ebbing as a
matter of agency policy, the underlying structural conditions that gave rise to the practice still
persist and repay closer analytical and doctrinal scrutiny. This Article offers that scrutiny and
discusses ways forward for AIA review.
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THE PROBLEM OF REDUDANCY REVIEW

The petitions for review that the Patent Office receives under the America
Invents Act (AIA) all share a common goal: to reevaluate the validity of patents
that the agency previously issued. These proceedings include inter partes
review, covered business method review, and post-grant review. The AIA
mechanisms for reviewing patent validity are the latest in a broader
administrative error correction regime that dates back to 1980. This Article
explores and evaluates a controversial practice that the Patent Office
undertook beginning early in the post-AIA regime: the practice of denying
otherwise meritonous requests for review on what the Office termed
"redundant" grounds.
The controversy over redundancy-based rejections had several sources.
One was that making such rejections required the Patent Office to decide
petitions piecemeal-and, indeed, the agency claimed that power for itself-
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even though it was not clear that this power lay within the statute. Another
source was that the Patent Office persistently declined to explain what, in the
agency's view, did or did not constitute redundancy. Still another source was
that the Patent Office resisted Federal Circuit oversight of this practice by
claiming unreviewable discretion as part of a larger campaign of selfimmunization. This confluence of problematic agency choices has generated
other, related controversies with AIA review as well, with a mixed record of
success for the Patent Office. Yet while redundancy-based rejection now
seems to be ebbing as a matter of agency policy, the underlying structural
conditions that gave rise to the practice still persist and repay closer analytical
and doctrinal scrutiny. This Article offers that scrutiny and discusses ways
forward for AIA review.
A.

THE NEED FOR PATENT VALIDITY REVIEW

The need for correcting the errors of patent examination has been well
documented in the literature. Applicants who submit their inventions for
review in the Patent Office enjoy a statutory presumption of patentability, and
it is the patent examiner who bears the burden of establishing that a patent
should not issue. 1 Compounding this procedural asymmetry, patent
examination itself is conducted in ex parte fashion between the examiner and
the applicant, with little third-party involvement or adversarial vetting of the
merits of the application.2 In the ex parte setting, patent applicants possess the
greatest amount of information pertaining to what they have actually invented
and how best to practice the invention, and are otherwise in the best position
to obtain such information efficiently.3 Examiners, by contrast, face significant
1. 35 U.S.C. 101 (2012) (providing that anyone who invents something that fits into
one of the broadly defined categories of eligible subject matter generally "may obtain a patent
therefor" so long as certain requirements are satisfied); 102 (providing that "[a] person shall
be entitled to a patent unless..." (emphasis added)). For a detailed discussion, and normative
critique, of this preference in favor of patent applicants, see generally Sean B. Seymore, The
Presumption ofPatentabiiy,97 MINN. L. REV. 990 (2013).
2. Historically, there was no tird-party involvement or even tird-party knowledge of
patent examination, as such proceedings were confidential. It was only after the 1999
American Inventors Protection Act that patent applications became subject to publication, 18
monts after filing, for te benefit of the public. Pub. L. No. 106-113, Subtitle E (1999). More
recently, the Patent Office has conducted a series of pilot programs through its Peer-to-Patent
initiative through which examiners accept public input bearing on the patentability of pending
applications. See generally PEER TO PATENT, www.peertopatent.org/
ttps://perma.cc/
AC2U-E9AR] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).

3. R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidefng Estoppel-Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 159, 213-14 (2002). Professor Wagner likens the asymmetry of information in
patent examination to the economics of bargaining under incomplete information. The most
important implication of tis phenomenon is that it allows strategic behavior by the participant
who is most well-informed here, the patent applicant-and that this strategic behavior is
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time and resource constraints in their task of fully characterizing the existing
state of technical knowledge and evaluating the invention at hand against that
body of knowledge to determine whether it is, indeed, patentable.4 Finally,
patents readily enter the world once they issue, but denied applications are
appealable to the administrative tribunal of the Patent Office and thereafter to
the federal courts. As a result, even if the likelihoods of improper patent grants
and improper patent denials were theoretically equal, 5 the availability of appeal
for denials would limit the risk of false negatives while the risk of false positives
would remain.' As it is, a patent's future value as a legal right is inherently
unforeseeable. So is an invention's future value as a technologically and
economically meaningful innovation. Taken together with those
unforeseeabilities, these asymmetries in patent examination make it all but
certain that patents that should not have issued, perhaps a great many, will
issue.
The ex post private and social costs of these ex ante examination errors
can be considerable. Patents confer broad property rights to exclude others
from the full range of economic activities associated with commercializing an
invention: making, selling, offering for sale, using, and importing are all
prohibited without the permission of the patent owner,' as is inducing another
to perform one of these activities 8 or contributing to another's performance
of one of these activities. 9 Where no meaningful economic substitutes exist in
the market for a patented invention, therefore, a patent owner enjoys

often privately beneficial but socially costly. Id. at 214-16.
4. A considerable literature, empirical as well as theoretical, is now emerging on
resource constraints in patent examination. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F.
Wasserman, Is the Time Alocated to Review PatentApplications Indudig Examiners to Grant Invalid
Patents?. Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data, 98 REv. ECON. & STAT. (forthcoming),
www.ssm.com/abstract=2467262 [https://perma.cc/WC24-H5EX]; Michael D. Frakes &
Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Man Bad Patents?.
Eidevnce from a Quasi-E>pedment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613 (2015); Mark A. Lemley, Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001).
5. These likelihoods are, of course, not likely to be equal given the other asymmetries
already discussed, including the presumption of patentability, the information advantage of
patent applicants, and the resource constraints of patent examiners. See supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
6. See Melis sa F. Was serman, The PTO'sAsymmefic Incentives: Pressureto ExpandSubstantive
PatentLaw, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379 (2011); Jonathan S. Masur, PatentInflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470
(2011); Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the FederalCircuit?, 121 YALE L.J. F. 335 (2011) (replying to
Masur); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, What Are the Sources of Paten Inflation?An Anna'ysis of Federal
CircuitPatentabili Rulings, 121 YALE L.J. F. 347 (2011) (replying to Masur); Jonathan S. Masur,
Inflation Indicators, 121 YALE L.J. F. 375 (2012) (surreplying to Rai and Ouellette).
7. See 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (2012).
8. See 35 U.S.C. 271(b).
9. See 35 U.S.C. 271(c).
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considerable market power and can set supracompetitive prices accordingly."0
Indeed, this static inefficiency in the market is the very thing that the patent
system offers to the patent owner as a limited reward for investing ex ante in
the often costly production of socially valuable technical knowledge that is
embodied in the invention."1 Patents granted in error, however, can generate
the short-term static inefficiency costs associated with market power without
the attendant long-term dynamic efficiency benefits of true innovation. 2
These effects accrue to the private benefit of the owner of the invalid patent
both at the private expense of competitors1 3 and at the social expense of
deadweight loss to consumers in the form of higher prices and fewer choices. 4

B.

THE ARC OF PATENT VALIDITY REVIEW

Appreciating the risk of these private and social costs, Congress since 1980
has enacted a series of reforms aimed not only at reducing the ex ante
likelihood that patents will issue in error but also at mitigating the ex post
harms of patents that did issue in error.15 The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act made issued
10. See Alan L. Durham, NaturalLaws and Inevitable Inflingement, 93 MINN. L. REV. 933,
989 (2009). Cf Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253,
296 n.128 (2003) (noting that "there are [reasons other than duplicability] why monopoly
power might be lacking even if duplication were impossible, such as when other sorts of
property confer similar advantages that prevent an owner of the nonduplicable property from
raising prices above cost. For example, while patents cannot be duplicated, sometimes they
lack market power because other patents provide substitutes for accomplishing the same
functional goal'). The courts have recognized this economic fact as well. See, e.g., Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44-46 (2006).
11. This is, in essence, the widely understood incentive theory of patent protection. See,

e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Sdentfic Research: Intellectual Property Rzghbts and the Norms of Science,
94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 116-17 (1999); FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 440 (2d ed. 1980).
12. See Michael Abramowicz, Pefecting PatentPrizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 129 (2003);
Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-AntitrustParadox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 770 (2002).
13. See Lemley, supranote 4, at 1516; Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents

Before Breakfast Propery Rghtsfr Business Concepts andPatentSystem Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH.

L.J. 577, 592 (1999); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Poliy, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 450, 455 (1969).
14. See Lemley, supranote 4, at 1516; Merges, supra note 13, at 593; Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 866-67
(1990).
15. Reforms aimed at improving the quality of examination itself have included 18month publication and third-party input into examination proceedings, as previously noted.
See supranote 2. They have also included structural changes such as making the Patent Office
a fee-funded agency rather than one that relies on legislative appropriations for its budget,
thereby enlarging the agency's resources and capacities. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,
Pub L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). More recent research, however, has questioned
whether the reliance of the Patent Office on fees obtained from its applicants may influence
the agency's incentives to grant patents based not solely on substantive merit but on
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patents subject to administrative reevaluation by the same agency that issued
them.16 Through reexamination, third parties could petition the Patent Office
to consider new evidence and reconsider old evidence of patentability and
determine whether the patent in question was, indeed, properly issued. As
originally constituted, however, patent reexamination was conducted ex parte
just as initial examination was. Thus, when the Patent Office did find a
reexamination request worthy of review, the proceeding left the control of the
third-party requestor and was, once again, limited to a dialogue between a selfinterested patent owner and a Patent Office examiner." In short, although ex
parte reexamination has certainly reflected error correction up to a point, the
incentives and abilities of patent owners in such cases have been to clarify and
strengthen their own patents rather than to invalidate them altogether, even
where invalidation may have been the socially optimal outcome.18
In response to public dissatisfaction with the ex parte limitations of
reexamination, Congress in 1999 introduced adversarial reexamination by
which third parties did not merely initiate Patent Office review of the validity
of issued patents, but actively prosecuted the review through its conclusion. 19
The availability of this inter partes reexamination was of particular and
immediate interest to defendants in patent litigation, who had already been
accused of infringing the patent, as their adversarial interests in vigorously
challenging the validity of the relevant patents were well defined. From the
implementation of inter partes reexamination in 2001 through its abolition and
replacement by the implementation of the AIA in 2013, requests for the
proceeding increasingly and predominantly originated as a defensive response
to infringement litigation. In all, some 62.9% of all inter partes reexamination
2
requests were associated with infringement litigation.

maximizing revenue. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, DoesAgengy Funding
Affect Decsionmakig?:"An EmpircalAssessment of the PTO's Grantng Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV.
67 (2013).
16. See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015

(1980).
17. See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (1997); seegeneraL/j Shannon M. Casey,
The Patent Reexamination Reform Act of 1994: A New Era of Third Pary Patuidpaion, 2J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 559 (1995).

18. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Youngest Patent Validt Proceeding.-EvaluatingPost-Grant
Review, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 333, 345-46 (2016).
19. See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-113, Title IV, Subtitle F (1999).
20. Data on inter partes reexamination and known related litigation is from the Patent
Office Performance and Accountability Reports.
PERFORMANCE

AND

ACCOUNTABILITY

See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,

REPORTS,

us/performance-and-planning/uspto-annual-reports/

https://www.uspto.gov/about-

[ttps://perma.cc/3TYX-ACA7].
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Nevertheless, though the inter partes reexamination requests that the
Patent Office did receive came primarily from litigation defendants, such
requests were not widely adopted as a general matter. The Patent Office
received only about 2,000 requests for inter partes reexamination throughout
the existence of the proceeding, 21 as compared with some 6,700 requests for
ex parte reexamination during the same period.
Usage of reexamination was shaped by interrelated factors that form the
conventionally recited case for administrative adjudication: the need for
expertise, the desire to avoid cost and delay, and the importance of broad
access. 2' Both ex parte and inter partes reexamination reflected these
instrumental goals, but not strongly enough. 24 By the time that a consensus
had emerged around the validity review mechanisms in the AIA, the depth and
detail of these administrative review proceedings were far closer to full-blown
trials than to a mere repetition of Patent Office examination. 25 Indeed, the
ability of the new proceedings to serve as substitutes for court litigation was a
26
conscious choice and oft-cited feature of the AIA.
C.

THE STRUCTURE OF

PTAB REVIEW

In apparent vindication of this push for more trial-like administrative
adjudication, usage of the AIA validity review mechanisms soon dwarfed that
of the old reexamination procedures. The proceeding that the public has used
most extensively so far is inter partes review. Since the proceeding became
available in September 2012, challengers have filed more than 4,000 petitions
for inter partes review. 27 That is, there have already been nearly a third as many
petitions for inter partes review in just four years as there have been petitions
for ex parte reexamination over the last 35 years. 28 Meanwhile, interest in

21. See Reexamination Information, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.
gov/learning- and-resources/ statistics/ reexamination-information [https://perma.cc/A34X44CU] (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
22. Id.
23. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Dedsion Making in
DualPTAB andDisrictCourt Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 51-55 (2016) (discussing
the traditional rationales for administrative adjudication of patent validity).
24. Some ready evidence of this insufficiency is simply the lack of usage of either form
of reexamination as of 2011. See Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 23, at 55-58.
25. See John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J.
1657, 1666 (2016).
26. See Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 23, at 58-64 (showing that AIA patent validity
review was intended-and does, in practice, largely operate-as a substitute for litigation in
the Article III courts).
27. Petition data is from the Docket Navigator service. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR,

www.docketnavigator.com [https://perma.cc/E7NL-T5DV].

28. See Reexamination Information, supranote 21.
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covered business method review since September 2012, was on the order of
400 petitions. 29 Finally, post-grant review was on the order of about 20
petitions.3" The nature, causes, and implications of these differences in usageas well as the particular scope of review and policy benefits that each of the
proceedings offers-are the subject of ongoing empirical research.31
The 2011 law created three major administrative proceedings: inter partes
review, covered business method review, and post-grant review. Each varies
in its scope for correcting the errors of patent examination, but each also has
much in common with the others. Importantly, all three are susceptible to
redundancy-based decision making. Although all three review proceedings are
intended to correct false-positive results in patent examination, each
proceeding offers a different set of error-corrections with respect to the types
of patents that may be challenged and the types of legal arguments and factual
evidence that may be considered. The Patent Office summarizes these
32
differences in a helpful chart.
Inter partes review is available for all patents, whether issued from
applications under the AIA's "first inventor to file" system of examination or
issued under the pre-AIA "first to invent" system of examination.3 3 A patent
may be challenged only on two legal grounds: that the patented invention was
anticipated by a previous invention and thus failed the novelty requirement,34
or the patented invention was obvious.35 Other substantive requirements for
patentability, such as adequately disclosing the invention, are unavailable in
inter partes review. 6 Similarly, only certain "prior art" evidence about previous
inventions that purport to show anticipation or obviousness is permitted:
generally, issued patents and printed publications.3 Other evidence, such as
prior offers for sale or public uses-though these would be disqualifying in
39
patent examination 38-are not permitted in inter partes review.
Covered business method review is also available regardless whether the

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. SeegeneraLy7 Vishnubhakat et al., sura note 23.
32. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MAJOR

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

IPR, PGR,

CBM., https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/aia trial-comp
arison chart.pptx [https://pema.cc/N5PU-9WHG].
33. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29 6(c)(2)(A) (2011),
125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C.).
34. See 35 U.S.C. 102 (2012).
35. See 35 U.S.C. 103.
36. See 35 U.S.C. 311(b).
37. See id.
38. See 35 U.S.C. 102(a).
39. See 35 U.S.C. 311(b).
AND
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patent issued from pre-AIA or post-AIA examination.40 However, review is
available only for patents that claim a defined category of business methods.41
Any legal ground that is otherwise available as an invalidity defense in court is
available in covered business method review.42 Correspondingly, evidence of
prior invention is also broadly available so long as it is the type of prior art that
was to be considered when the patent was first examined.43
Post-grant review follows a mix of these parameters. As with inter partes
review, patents from all fields are reviewable. As with covered business method
review, legal grounds for challenge are broadly available and prior art is broadly
permitted. 44 However, only patents that issued under the post-AIA "first
45
inventor to file" regime are subject to post-grant review.
What these different proceedings share are four important procedural
features that are relevant to the agency's practice of adjudicating petitions on
redundancy-related grounds. First, all three forms of review originate as trialtype adversarial proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. This
alone is a major difference from reexamination, which was conducted first
before an examiner and then was appealed, as needed, to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences. The AIA patent validity reviews are conducted by
scientifically and legally expert administrative patent judges in the first instance,
and the resulting substantive judgments are appealable directly to the Federal
Circuit. As a result, all three proceedings answer to the same appellate court,
one that has a complex administrative-law relationship with the agency that it
oversees.
Second, all three proceedings begin not as a matter of right but through
petitions for review that must specify the patent claims whose validity is in
question, the patentability grounds on which each challenge rests, and
supporting evidence. 46 The agency has authority to proceed with the review
sought in a given case based on the merits of a given petition. The agency may
40. See 35 U.S.C. 321(c); AIA 18(a)(1)(A) (2011).
41. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 18(d)(1) (2011) (defining
such a patent as one "that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data
processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a
financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological
inventions").
42. See 35 U.S.C. 321(b) (referring to defenses in 35 U.S.C.
282(b)(2)-(3)).

43. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 18(a)(1)(C) (2011).
44. See 35 U.S.C. 321(b).
45. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 6(t)(2) (A) (2011).
46. See 35 U.S.C. 312(a), 322(a). The procedural requirements for a covered business
method are the same as those for a post-grant review, including available grounds for
challenge, permissible evidence, the pleading standard for the petition, and the processes by
which the pre- and post-institution phases are conducted. See Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29

18(a)(1) (2011).
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institute an inter partes review only if "there is a reasonable likelihood that the
petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in
the petition."4 Similarly, the agency may institute a covered business method
review or post-grant review either if "it is more likely than not that at least one
of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable"4 8 or if "the petition
raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or
patent applications." 49 In all cases, however, the agency's threshold institution
decision is "final and nonappealable," regardless whether the decision is to
institute review or to deny it.5" These nonappealability provisions are a source
of considerable controversy, including a case that the Supreme Court recently
decided.51
Third, all three proceedings are subject to partial institution, a practice born
of Patent Office regulation with no express statutory mandate. The two
outcomes that the AIA contemplates for any petition seeking inter partes,
covered business method, or post-grant review are that the petition be
instituted or that the petition be denied.52 The regulations that implement the
statute, however, go further and provide that the agency may "authorize the
review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some
of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim." 3 Conversely, the
regulations also provide that the agency may "deny some or all grounds for
unpatentability for some or all of the challenged claims., 54 For all three types
of petitions, the denial by the agency of a particular ground for challenge is
deemed a "decision not to institute" the petition on that ground.5 5 The effect
of this declared equivalence-between the denial of a ground and the denial
of a petition as to that ground-is to invoke the nonappealability provisions
of the organic statute that renders a decision "whether to institute" insulated
from judicial review. 56 The assumption of authority by the Patent Office to
make partial institutions is a source of further controversy and represents an
additional and necessary doctrinal step toward adjudicating petitions based on
whether grounds within a given petition are redundant to each other.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

35 U.S.C. 314(a).
35 U.S.C. 324(a).
35 U.S.C. 324(b).
35 U.S.C.
314(d), 324(e).
SeegeneraLy Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131 (2016).
52. See 35 U.S.C. 314(a), 324(a).
53. 37 C.F.R. 42.108(a) (2018) (providing for partial institution in inter partes review);
37 C.F.R. 42.208(a) (providing for partial institution in post-grant review); see 37 C.F.R.
42.300(a) (providing that the procedures governing partial institution in post-grant review
apply as well to covered business method review).
54. 37 C.F.R. 42.108(b), 42.208(b).
55. 37 C.F.R.
56. 35 U.S.C.

42.108(b), 42.208(b).
314(d), 324(e).
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Fourth, all three proceedings trigger robust forms of estoppel against
petitioners both with respect to future administrative proceedings within the
Patent Office and with respect to litigation in other fora. For any inter partes
review that results in a final written decision regarding the validity of a
particular patent claim, the party that sought the review is estopped to
challenge the validity of that patent claim again.5 Estoppel applies equally to
challenges in Patent Office review proceedings and to civil actions in the
federal courts and in International Trade Commission proceedings.5 8 It also
applies equally to grounds for challenge that the petitioner actually raised and
to grounds that the petitioner reasonably could have raised during the inter
partes review.59 An exactly analogous estoppel provision governs post-grant
reviews as well.6" Covered business method reviews, meanwhile, do trigger
estoppel both as to grounds that the petitioner actually raised and grounds that
the petitioner reasonably could have raised, but only in future administrative
proceedings in the Patent Office, not in future civil actions in the federal courts
or in International Trade Commission proceedings.61 In light of this robust
framework of estoppel for all three review proceedings, the specter of
petitioners being forever barred from vindicating their substantive arguments
in the future-while also being denied the chance to present some of their
substantive arguments to the Patent Office in the present is foremost among
the harms from the Patent Office practice of adjudicating petitions based on
redundancy.
These procedural similarities among inter partes review, covered business
method review, and post-grant review are significant because they evince an
intent by Congress that procedural interpretations regarding one type of
proceeding will likely resolve the issue in the same way for all three.62 Indeed,
the Patent Office practice of adjudicating petitions based on whether some
grounds are redundant to others originated in a covered business method
review decision63 and was quickly adopted into inter partes review decisions as
57. See 35 U.S.C. 315(e).
58. See 35 U.S.C. 315(e)(1), 315(e)(2).
59. See 35 U.S.C. 315(e)(1), 315(e)(2).
60. See 35 U.S.C. 325(e).
61. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 18(a)(1)(A) (2011)
(exempting covered business method review from the effect of 35 U.S.C. 325(e)(2)).
62. See generaly NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2B SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

51:2 (7th ed.) (explaining that where "previous statutes relating

to the same subject" are in force, "the new provision is presumed to accord with the legislative
policy embodied in those prior statutes"); see also id. at 51:3 (explaining that statutes that are
inpati maeria, i.e., that have the same purpose as to the same subject matter as each other,
ought to be interpreted in light of one another).
63. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2012-00003, 2012 WL
9494791 (P.T.A.B. October 25, 2012).
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well. " Likewise, currently pending disputes over the scope of the
nonappealability statute in inter partes review are widely expected to set broad
precedents for covered business method and post-grant review as well, 5 for
an identical provision governs the latter proceedings as well." Accordingly, the
nature of redundancy-based decision making by the Patent Office, its
consequences, and ultimately its defensibility as a doctrine apply across all
three types of patent validity review proceedings.

D.

THE REJECTION OF REDUNDANT GROUNDS

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) has used the talisman of
redundancy to choose between legalgrounds for invalidity as well as to choose
between factualpredicatesfor invalidity arguments, such as prior art references.
Although choosing between duplicative factual evidence is potentially more
defensible than choosing between legal grounds, neither is authorized by
statute in quite the way that the agency has done.

Redundancy of legal arguments is, to some extent, inherent in the legal
requirements for patentability.6 Patent law requires broadly that the invention
must reflect patent-eligible subject matter.68 Beyond this, the invention must

satisfy two sets of substantive criteria: innovation-related requirements and
disclosure-related requirements. 9 To ensure innovation, an invention must be

64. See Ranbaxy Lab., Ltd. v. Vertex Pharm., Inc., No. 2013-00024, 2013 WL 8595397
(P.T.A.B. November 15, 2013).
65. See SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (applying
the previously confirmed nonappealability of agency decisions on inter partes review petitions
to confirm the nonappealability of agency decisions on covered business method review
petitions based on the identicality of the provisions); Michael Rosato & Richard Torczon, A

DiidedFederal Circuit Confirms Broadest Reasonable Inteipretationfor Claims in Inter PartesReview on
Reheating WSGR ALERT (ly
8, 2015), https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?
SectionName =publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-cuozzo-0715.htm
[https://perma.cc/
U7NQ-8F33 ] (observing that the Federal Circuit's reasoning in finding inter partes petition
decisions nonappealable "was broadly applicable to the other PTAB post-grant trials"); Fabian

M. Koenigbauer & Steven J. Schwarz, In iv Cuo~Zo: The FederalCircuit Affirms the PTAB's Finding
of Unpatentabiliy, VENABLE LLP (Mar. 17, 2015) www.venable.com/in-re-cuozzo-the-federalcircuit- affirms -the-ptab s-finding-o f-unp atentability- 03-17-2015/
[https://perma.cc/AYR8YPJP] (predicting that the nonappealability of inter partes petition decisions would likely apply
to the other AIA proceedings "because of similarities in the statutory language and rules').
66. Cf 35 U.S.C.
314(d), 324(e) (2012).
67. See generaLyJohn M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Isef, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629,
673-99 (2016) (discussing doctrinal redundancy in patent law).
68. See 35 U.S.C. 101.
69. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, TheAnirusfing ofPatentabiliy,48 SETON HALL L. REv. 71,
88-93 (2017) (explaining the innovation- and disclosure-related requirements of patentability).
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useful, 0 new, " and nonobvious. " To ensure disclosure, the patent
specification must enable a reader to make and use the invention," must
describe the invention well enough to show that the inventor actually
possessed the invention as claimed, 4 and must claim the invention precisely
enough that the boundaries of the legal right are definite." All of these
requirements are evaluated from the standpoint of the fictive person having
ordinary skill in the relevant art. 6This fictive person, in turn, is presumed to
be familiar with the state of relevant knowledge and prior art in that
technology."
Thus, one may easily imagine, for example, analytical overlap between
innovation-related requirements such as novelty and nonobviousness. Both
compare the invention at hand to the preexisting body of technical knowledge
and ask whether the invention is sufficiently different from what came before.
Novelty may be the easier hurdle to clear because all of the invention's essential
features must be present in a single prior reference to defeat novelty."8 By
contrast, a challenger may rely on a combination of prior art references to show
that an invention-though new-would have been obvious. Nevertheless,
because an invention is patentable only if it satisfies every requirement,
prevailing on any single ground for challenge is enough for invalidation. In
that sense, a petition for review that challenges novelty and nonobviousness
makes redundant arguments. One might proceed with novelty and ignore
nonobviousness, or vice-versa, and reach the same bottom-line outcome of
invalidity.
Meanwhile, it may seem less inherently problematic to dismiss as
redundant the factual predicates of a case, such as prior art. This is because,
where the available evidence points to a determinate conclusion, additional
evidence is simply unnecessary and offers diminishing marginal adjudicatory
benefits relative to the costs. For example, a petitioner seeking inter partes
review may argue that the first claim of a patent is invalid for lack of novelty,
and offer three prior art references each of which purportedly anticipates the
70.
71.
72.
73.

See
See
See
See

35
35
35
35

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

101.
102.
103.
1112(a).

74. Id.

75. See 35 U.S.C. 112(b).
76. See genera'ly Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, 45
900-01 (2017).

HOFSTRA L. REv. 899,

77. See id. at 932 (citing In ie Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (conjuring
an inventor "working in his shop with the prior art references-which he is presumed to
know hanging on the walls around hin').
78. See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
79. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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claim. As anticipation must be proven on the basis of a single reference-i.e.,
every element of the claimed invention must be present in the asserted
reference-the PTAB might institute review on novelty grounds based only
on one reference, perhaps what it considers the strongest reference. The other
novelty-defeating references would not be considered but instead rejected as
redundant. As with legal redundancy, such a choice may seem intuitively
reasonable, especially as a matter of case management, which the AIA
specifically entrusts to the PTAB.80
The problem with these intuitions, however, has been their uneasy basis in
the statutory text. Perhaps worse is the Patent Office's stance until recently
against defending its redundancy-based decision making or even
acknowledging its analytical content. A clearly elucidated doctrine of
redundancy might well have been within the powers of the PTAB-and if not,
the Federal Circuit could have provided correction and oversight from the
start. Instead, the agency started from an expansive position of absolute
immunity both from judicial review and from an obligation to explain, in a
prospective manner by which it could later be held to account, just what it
meant by redundancy.
II.

THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM

As a result, it was predictable-and PTAB petitioners did predict at the
time-that rejections for redundancy would introduce new uncertainty into
AIA review through the estoppel provisions. If a petitioner failed to include
any grounds or arguments in its petition, it would be estopped to raise them in
later court or agency proceedings as matter that it "reasonably could have
raised." 81 But if the petitioner did include those grounds and the PTAB
rejected them as redundant, then estoppel might attach as matter that the
petitioner actually "raised." 82 Until estoppel effects could be clarified, their
uncertain application based on PTAB actions beyond the petitioner's control
presented a chilling effect upon the ability of petitioners to challenge the
validity of patents in the very ways that the AIA provides.8 3

80. See 35 U.S.C.

81. 35 U.S.C.

315(d), 325(d).

315(e), 325(e).

82. 35 U.S.C.
315(e), 325(e).
83. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc.,
817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Nos.2015-1116, 2015-1119), 2015 WL 227464, at *65-68
[hereinafter Shaw Brief].
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THE CLAIM TO ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL UNREVIEWABILITY

The clearest expression of the initial Patent Office position on
redundancy-based screening of PTAB petitions came in Shaw Industies Group,
Inc. v. Automated CreelSystems, Inc.84 In that case, Shaw sought inter partes review
on all twenty-one claims of Automated Creel's U.S. Patent No. 7,806,360.8 In
support, Shaw advanced fifteen grounds, each a combination of a particular
legal basis ( 102 or 103), certain prior art, and the particular patent claim to
which it applied.8 6 The PTAB granted review, as it often has, piecemeal. Most,
but not all, of the challenged patent claims were accepted for review. 87 Some,
but not all, of the asserted grounds were accepted for review. 88 Specifically, the
PTAB rejected the argument that U.S. Patent No. 4,515,328 by inventor Payne
anticipated claims 6, 7, 13, 15-18, and 21 of Automated Creel's '360 Patent. 89
The PTAB found this argument redundant in light of other arguments that
these claims were obvious in light of other prior art.90 Thus, the conclusion
seemed to reflect legal as well as factual redundancy.
But there was no way to be sure. Shaw disputed the PTAB's conclusion
that an anticipation challenge under Payne was, in fact, redundant to the
obviousness challenges, and also disputed the PTAB's authority to deem
grounds redundant at all. 91 Rather than engage with the conclusion of
redundancy or explain its reasoning, the Patent Office on appeal proposed that
the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction even to consider the practice.92
"I]here is no 'redundancy doctrine,' " the agency said: such terminology
was merely "to explain the notion of streamlining the IPR proceedings for
efficiency reasons."" The decision whether to institute was unreviewable
under 35 U.S.C. 314(d), which provides that such a decision is "final and
nonappealable."9 4 The agency's brief cited further to the Federal Circuit panel
decision in In re CuoZ.Zo, 9 which would later be affirmed by the Supreme

84. 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
85. See id. at 1295-96.
86. See id. at 1296.

87. See id.
88. See id. at 1296-97.

89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1298.
92. See Brief for Intervenor, Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817
F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Nos. 2015-1116,2015-1119), 2015 WL 1875621, at *18 [hereinafter
Brief for Intervenor].
93. Id. at *17.
94. Id. at *16.
95. 778 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Court. 96 Importantly, the Patent Office rooted its argument of efficiency and
streamlined proceedings in
316(b) and 326(b), which look to "the efficient
administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete
proceedings." 9 It did not look to 325(d), which provides expressly that, "in
determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter,
chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and
reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior
art or arguments previously were presented to the Office." 9
This choice is puzzling because
325(d) seems much more squarely
relevant to the concern of duplicative prior art or arguments. The likely answer
lies in the agency's self-conferred power to institute petitions piecemeal, a
PTAB practice that dates from the earliest days of AIA review.
Shaw asserts that the Board cannot institute an IPR proceeding on some,
but not all, grounds proposed. That is, according to Shaw, the Board must
institute a trial on all grounds presented in an IPR petition. In essence, Shaw
challenges the Board's institution decision, which is not reviewable by this
Court. 99 The part of the IPR that is reviewable is the Board's decision with
respect to the "patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner"
which is limited to those grounds for which the Board instituted the IPR.U
Thus, the Patent Office conceptualized its power to reject redundant
grounds as simply a specific instance of its power to pick and choose elements
of a petition to institute, and connected this partial institution power to the
nonappealability statute.
Although the panel majority accepted this view, Judge Reyna issued a
strongly worded concurrence expressing grave concerns that the Patent
Office's "claim to unchecked discretionary authority is unprecedented." ' In
his view, the trouble was not necessarily that the agency asserted the power to
differentiate between original grounds and redundant ones, but that the agency
altogether declined to give "any reasoned basis whb or hor the denied grounds
are redundant" indeed, it claimed immunity from being judicially compelled
to do so. 10 2 Importantly, Judge Reyna also questioned the majority's conclusion
that the grounds on which the PTAB had denied institution would simply not
be subject to estoppel,"0 3 noting instead that the issue of whether estoppel
96. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016).
97. 35 U.S.C.
316(b), 326(b) (2012).
98. 35 U.S.C. 325(d).
99. 35 U.S.C. 314(d); Cuozjo, 778 F.3d at 1276-77.
100. Shaw Brief, supra note 83, at *58-75.
101. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (Reyna, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 1302.
103. See id. at 1299-300.
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applies "is not for the Board or the PTO to decide. Nor is it for us [the Federal
Circuit] to decide in the first instance"-but rather is for a district court or the
ITC to decide.10 4
B.

INCONSISTENCY WITH THE POWER TO INSTITUTE

This expansive view by the Patent Office of its own authority is
questionable for three related statutory reasons. First is that the AIA's
provisions for instituting on a petition establish only necessary conditions for
whether review should be granted, not sufficient conditions. Second is that the
question of whether review should be had is analytically distinguishable from
the extent and scope of that review. Third is that although the PTAB enjoys
some insulation from judicial review, that insulation is not indeed, cannot
be-as far-reaching as the Patent Office has suggested.
In general, the Director "may not authorize [review] ... unles)' the specified
criteria are met, namely an adequate likelihood of success on the merits of the
petition. 105 In post-grant review, one may establish instead the existence of a
"'novel or unsettled legal question" instead of a likelihood of successl 6 but
one of these two must be shown. Because the statute does not enumerate any
sufficient conditions, the Patent Office cannot point to the statute as
approving its claimed power to police and reject redundant grounds. At most,
the statute gives discretion to specify what the sufficient conditions for review
ought to be, 10' though the exercise of that discretion, of course, requires
reasonableness and reason-giving under conventional administrative law
principles108
The difficulties continue. The ability to decide "whether to institute ...
review"' 10 9 may be a binary power as it seems on its face to be. Or it may contain

104. Id. at 1305 (Reyna, J., concurring).
105. 35 U.S.C.
314(a), 324(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
106. 35 U.S.C. 324(b).
107. See 35 U.S.C.
316(a)(2), 326(a)(2).
108. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 226-27 (2006) (arguing
that the Supreme Court's approach to judicial deference in the Chtstensen, Mead, and Barnhart
cases "would ensure that agency interpretations would receive Chevron deference only if they
were a product of procedures that increase the likelihood of reasoned decision-making');
Thomas W. Merrill & Jristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 885 (2001)
(explaining that "norms of reasoned decision-making will compel the decisionmaker to
provide an explanation for the agency's resolution of the issue'). To put the point another
way, the Patent Office can read the statute as giving it discretion but must then subject itself
to judicial review in order to ensure that the agency is adequately satisfying its obligations to
explain itself Alternatively, the Patent Office can argue for absolute immunity from judicial
review, but it must then be prepared to limit that extraordinary autonomy only to powers
clearly enumerated in the statute. The agency cannot have it both ways.
109. 35 U.S.C.
314(a), 324(a).
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within it the lesser power to institute as to some, but not all, portions of a
petition as the agency's regulations provide.110 Again, the statute does not
unequivocally give the power to make partial institutions, just as it does not
unequivocally specify sufficient conditions for deciding whether to institute.
Thus, again, the Patent Office cannot point to the statute as approving its
practice. At most, the statute by its ambiguity might be read to give discretion
for choosing between a binary power over institution or a lesser-included
power to make partial institutions.111 But exercising this discretion, too, would
require reasonableness and reason-giving.
Thus, an unaccountable agency power to reject redundant grounds does
not seem viable. The Patent Office's response to this in Shaw Industries and
other cases has been that although conventions of reason-giving and, indeed,
administrative law's broad presumption in favor of reviewability would
ordinarily require judicial oversight and agency explanation, the AIA
specifically superseded these default rules. 2 In Cuo.Zo, the Supreme Court
held not only that the PTAB's decision whether to institute was unreviewable
but also that other "closely tied" issues such as clarity or adequacy of evidence
in the petition are also entrusted to the agency's evaluative discretion,
unreviewable by the courts. 1 3
The problem with applying Cuo.Z.o expansively to institution-related
decisions is not that it is difficult, but that it is too easy. Because the basic
necessary criterion for institution is a likelihood of success on the merits of the
case, every aspect of the eventual adjudication has potential overlaps and
parallels with the initial institution decision. 1 4 Thus, for example, the Patent
Office has argued in the past that the one-year deadline within the filing of an
infringement lawsuit, after which a petition for inter partes review cannot be
instituted, is not an exogenous statutory constraint on agency power but
merely another part of the institution decision-and insulated from review
accordingly.1 The agency has argued even that the PTAB obligation to issue
final written decisions on the validity of challenged patent claims is constrained
110. 37 C.F.R.

42.108 (2018).

111. This choice is no longer hypothetical, as the Supreme Court in SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu
has now held that 314(a) unambiguously forbids partial institution. See 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1360
(2018).
112. Brief for Intervenor, supra note 92, *32-33; see also Brief for Respondent, Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016), 2016 WL 1165967, at *49-50.
113. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016).
114. See generaLy Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Porous Court-Agengy Boundagy in Patent Law, 51
AKRON L. REv. 1069 (2018) (discussing the incremental expansion by the Patent Office of
unreviewability under 314(d) based on analytical overlap between institution and merits
adjudication).
115. See, e.g., Achates Reference Publ'g, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F. 3d 652, 657-58 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
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by this discretionary and unreviewable power at the institution stage.11 In
other words, taken to its conclusion, the Patent Office view of its insulation
from judicial review extends up to and including merits adjudications even
though these are plainly reviewable. 11'
The key downstream implication of the Patent Office's position is a
particularly difficult dilemma. If these issues of sufficient conditions to
institute, the power to make partial institutions, and the power to self-define
adjudicatory obligations are all so related to institution that judicial review is
unavailable, then the agency's opaque non-doctrine of redundancy could
persist indefinitely with no correction or clarity. The only safety valve that
might trigger judicial intervention would be a problem of constitutional
magnitude, as the Court noted in Cuoz.Zo. 118
Indeed, such a constitutional defect is quite possible. An application of
estoppel that denied the petitioner both a meaningful opportunity to make
arguments in the PTAB, due to a redundancy rejection, and an opportunity to
make the arguments later in court or the ITC 119would probably run afoul of
due process. However, the canon of constitutional avoidance counsels that the
estoppel provision be construed to avoid the due process problem.120 In other
words, a court adjudicating estoppel in this context would be obliged to
tolerate the problem of rejecting redundant grounds rather than face the
constitutional implications in a way that could enable judicial review of the
underlying problem.
C.

WHERE CHEVRON BREAKS DowN

The importance of these points about statutory ambiguity and the agency's
broad view of its own discretion is that reasoned decision making is intimately
connected to the availability of judicial review. Under the familiar two-step
Chevron framework, for example, an agency is entitled to deference where it ( 1)
administers an ambiguous statute and (2) adopts an interpretation that is

116. See, e.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F. 3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In
brief, the argument is that although the obligation to write final written decisions plainly exists
and the final written decisions themselves are plainly subject to judicial review, the PTAB can
nevertheless narrow the scope of those final written decisions through its unreviewable power
to institute on some claims and not on others. Thus, what is plainly reviewable may still
potentially be at least partly unreviewable.
117. Vishnubhakat, supranote 114, at 1079-80.
118. Cuozjo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141.
119. See supranotes 81-83 and accompanying text.
120. See generaLy Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (explaining that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of
a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to
avoid such problems").
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reasonable. 1 Similarly, under the familiar Chene doctrine, a court evaluating
the propriety of an agency action can rest its evaluation only on reasons that
the agency itself has given-not on any justifications that the court itself might
think appropriate122 -and this presupposes that judicial review is available. The
redundancy-based reasoning of the Patent Office would be much less
problematic, both practically and theoretically, if ordinary judicial oversight
were available to correct it. However, in addition to Chevron deference for legal
interpretations made during patent validity review, the Patent Office also now
enjoys a far rarer prize in administrative law: an express statutory grant of
virtually unreviewable discretion on certain issues."' 3 The result is a framework
in which one deference inquiry depends recursively on another, a notable new
anomaly of administrative process.
The basic idea of "recursive deference" is as follows. The two-step Chevron
analysis requires Chene to be satisfied at step two. That is, a court may find
an agency action reasonable, and thus worthy of Chevron deference, only by
evaluating the agency's own reasoning under Cheneg. Yet Cheneg and Chevron
both presuppose the availability of judicial review, and agency actions are
sometimes accorded absolute deference with no judicial review at all. In such
cases, eventual Chevron deference for an agency action requires a second
analysis into the underlying question of absolute deference to the action. The
same problem may arise-indeed, does arise-with two interrelated agency
actions, one of which receives absolute deference, with no judicial review, and
the other within Chevron's ordinary domain. The scope of the unreviewable
agency action may be broad enough, or the relation between the two agency
actions may be close enough, that the ostensibly reviewable action that is being
considered for Chevron must be analyzed recursively to determine whether
absolute deference attaches or else review is truly available.
It is a new and open question of judicial policy whether recursive deference
offers benefits worth the costs. What follows is an analytical account of
recursive deference within the broader framework of judicial review of agency
action, as well as of the observed effects of recursive deference in patent law.
This account begins with three major categories in the administrative law of
deference. The first two pertain to cases where courts give agencies absolute
deference by abstaining altogether from judicial review. The third pertains to
cases where courts review agency action with varying degrees of intensity.
These familiar categories not only are a yardstick for patent exceptionalism but
also form the analytical raw material for the current state of affairs in the Patent
121. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984).
122. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
123. See 35 U.S.C. 314(d) (2012); CuozZo, 136 S.Ct. at 2139-42.
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Office, where a question of deference on one issue now often turns on a
second, recursive question of deference on a different issue.
III.

THE PTAB'S PLACE IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY
ACTION

It is well to be clear at the outset that the discussion to follow regards
unreviewability of agency action as a form of deference-indeed, the most
extreme form. This may seem odd, and a more intuitive view might be that
deference is possible only if review can be had at all. The reason to consider
unreviewability as part of a spectrum of deference is that this is largely what
courts have done. The law governing judicial review of agency action,
especially what makes agency actions unreviewable, speaks functionally and at
times quite pragmatically about issues such as partial unreviewability, engaging
in review to decide whether review is proper, and reconciling the
Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) apparent insulation of agency
discretion with the APA's command to set aside abuses of agency discretion.
A.

ACTIONS UNREVIEWABLE BY STATUTE

The APA provides a baseline of judicial review for agency actions124 but
defers completely to the agency where a review-preclusion statute applies 25 or
where the action is committed to agency discretion by law. 26 Statutes that
purport to preclude review pose two notable interpretive challenges as to
whether they insulate specific agency actions. The interpretive challenge may
be in discovering what Congress intended through its legislative act or in
determining the level of generality at which the agency's action is to be
considered.
As to Congressional intent, statutes are often clear either in affording
review or in precluding it, but certain close cases do recur. 2 These may include
legislative silence about judicial review where review would be disruptive128 or
preclusion of judicial review generally with little to say about unusual fact
scenarios. 129 Close cases may also include the paradoxical situation where
Congress specifically affords review and raises the possibility that the
enumeration of certain mechanisms implies the exclusion of others. 30

124. See 5 U.S.C.
701-706 (2012).
125. See 5 U.S.C. 701(a) (1) (2012).
126. See 5 U.S.C. 701(a) (2) (2012).
127. Nicholas Bagley, The Pu.Zzing Presumption of Reziewabiliy, 127 HARV. L. REv. 1285,
1290 (2014).
128. See, e.g., Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
129. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
130. See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43 (1993). This line of reasoning rests
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This last is paradoxical because it can turn a review-granting statute on its
head to justify denying review. It is also potentially problematic for Congress
because it may require the legislator to specify in detail, even impossible detail,
when judicial review is to be available. Moreover, the canon of implied
exclusion could easily cut the other way so that courts read review-precluding
statutes to say that the enumeration of certain preclusions leaves a great many
other agency actions still reviewable.
The current solution to this ambiguity is a substantive presumption in
favor of judicial review over agency actions.131 Since the Supreme Court first
articulated the presumption in Abbott Laboratories v.Gardner,132a statute that
purports to preclude judicial review of agency action may do so only by "clear
and convincing" indications that Congress so intended. 133 To be clear and
convincing, in turn, evidence of intent to preclude review must be " 'fairly
discernible' in the detail of the legislative scheme. 134
Moreover, adjacent to the substantive presumption in favor of judicial
review is the so-called "common law of preclusion," a common law that
governs the content of preclusion statutes by protecting certain types of agency
action against review preclusion more vigorously than others. 13 For example,
constitutionally oriented challenges to agency action are virtually unreachable
by statutes to preclude judicial review. 136 Legal challenges are less stringently
protected against unreviewable agency discretion than constitutional ones are,
but are still difficult to insulate from review. 131 Meanwhile, factual challenges
receive still less protection and so are most susceptible to preclusion statutes.138
The mechanisms by which a statute precludes review may, of course, vary
greatly. Beyond the simple case of expressly precluding review of a welldefined agency action, Congress may, for example, insulate agencies by
legislating the timing of judicial review. Indeed, the fallout from the Abbot
on the interpretive canon of"expressio unius est exclusio alterius," literally that "to express or
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

131. See Bagley, supra note 127, at 1286 (recounting cases that refer to the presumption as
"strong," "basic," and "fundamental"); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption ofReviewabifiy: A
Study in CanonicalConstruction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 751 (1992) (noting the
connection between a presumption of judicial reviewability and the very legitimacy of
administrative power).
132. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
133. Id. at 141; Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016).
134. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984).
135. Ronald M. Levin, UnderstandingUvreviewabiiy in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV.
689, 739-40 (1990).
136. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988).

137. See, e.g.,
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 301 (1978).
138. See, e.g., Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 798 (1985).
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decision itself reflected just this approach. Prior to Abbott, certain Food and
Drug Administration regulations were statutoily subject to pre-enforcement
review in the courts, though the regulations at issue in the case were not.139
Instead, argued the FDA Commissioner, the regulations at issue were
reviewable only in the context of a final order based on the rule.140 The Court
disagreed and allowed pre-enforcement review even of the regulations
unenumerated by Congress, explaining that "[t]he right to review is too
important to be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of
legislative intent" as the canon of implied exclusion.141
Subsequently, however, Congress enacted "a senies of agency jurisdictional
statutes that turned Abbott full circle by limiting judicial review [exclusively]
'
to the pre-enforcement stage."142
The upshot of this legislation was to keep the
outcome of Abbott intact-that is, to allow pre-enforcement review of the sort
that the petitioners had sought and the Court had granted-but to reclaim for
Congress the power to "control the timing of access to the courts as it had
'
successfully done in pre-Abbott days."143
Apart from whether Congress truly intended to preclude review, the other
notable interpretive difficulty with preclusion statutes is the level of generality
at which to conceptualize the agency action that a court may insulate or
scrutinize. Congress may try to legislate with precision what general or
particular agency action it wishes to make reviewable or unreviewable. The
Court, too, has held that preclusion must not extend beyond the issues
Congress intended to insulate. 144 Nevertheless, the presumption of
reviewability, in its current form, gives interpreting courts much freedom to
frame an agency action broadly or narrowly to further jurisprudential or
normative goals. Part of this freedom comes from the open-ended nature of
the presumption itself. Whether evidence that is discernible from the legislative
scheme is sufficiently clear and convincing has been an elastic enough standard
that review has sometimes been precluded even without express statutory
text14 5 and has sometimes been allowed even in spite of preclusionary statutory
text.146

139. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
140. Brief for the Respondents, Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (No. 39),
1966 WL 115408, at *42.

141. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 141

(citing LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 357 (1965)).

142. Paul R. Verkuil, Congressional imitations on JudidialRetiew ofRules, 57 TUL. L. REV. 733,
734 (1983) (emphasis added).

143. Id.
144. See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991).
145. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994).
146. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1970).
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More fundamentally, however, judicial freedom to frame agency actions
broadly or narrowly with an eye toward the normative desirability of judicial
review reflects larger concerns about the rule of law and the separation of
powers. One may reasonably suppose, for example, that judicial suspicion of
arbitrary or unaccountable agency abuses would tend to produce narrow
framings of agency action when construing statutes that preclude review and
broad framings when construing statutes that afford review. Seeing itself as a
guardian of individuals' rights to "claim the protection of the laws," 14' such a
court would be skeptical of an executive that would insulate itself from
scrutiny, of a Congress that would broadly delegate the executive the tools to
do so, and of the meager power that would remain for "the judicial department
to say what the law is." '48
Conversely, one may suppose that judicial confidence in the democratic
legitimacy and institutional competence of agencies, especially agencies with
relevant technical expertise, would produce the opposite framings. 49 Where
statutes purport to preclude review, the insulated agency action would be
viewed more broadly; where they afford review, more narrowly. The salience
of the level-of-generality problem is that it is independent of the substantive
presumption of reviewability. A court obliged to apply a clear and strong
presumption may nevertheless be able to expose an agency to review simply
by defining the insulated agency action narrowly, and vice-versa.
These two interpretive challenges for preclusion statutes-ascertaining the
preclusionary intent of Congress and conceptualizing the agency action in
question-matter because administrative law itself views agency action
recursively. The APA defines the term "agency action" broadly to include "the
whole orapartof an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent
or denial thereof, or failure to act."1 51In other words, an agency's ultimate
conclusion on a disputed issue is an agency action; each underlying argument
that supports the ultimate conclusion is an agency action; the doctrinal
elements of each underlying argument are all agency actions; and so on. This
recursive definition has important implications for judicial review of the
actions of the Patent Office.

147. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (quoting

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)).
148. Marbug, 5 U.S. at 177.
149. Indeed, this approach might also be reconciled with the separation of powers if it
were conceded that the proper judicial role is rather narrower and that "some interests are not
intended to be protected by courts." Sandra Day O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion ofJudicial
Review in England and the United States, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 643, 644 (1986) (arguing that
this is, in fact, the case as a descriptive matter).
150. 5 U.S.C. 551(13) (2012) (emphasis added).
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ACTIONS COMMITTED TO AGENCY DISCRETION

By contrast to preclusion statutes under 5 U.S.C.
701(a) (1),
unreviewability based on agency discretion under 701(a)(2) rests not on a
court's respect for a Congressional mandate against judicial review but rather
on a court's respect for traditions of abstaining from review of certain types of
action.151 The contours of that judicial self-restraint are shaped, in turn, by two
sets of considerations: extrinsically, the availability and adequacy of standards
by which judicial review could even proceed; more intrinsically, the nature or
attributes of the agency action itself. 15 2 Agency actions that are intrinsically
beyond judicial review or that have attributes that counsel unreviewability for
historical or constitutional reasons are outside the scope of this Article. For
the present discussion of recursive deference, it is having appropriate
standards for judicial review that is important.
The importance of manageable standards reflects the familiar doctrine that
agency action should not be deemed unreviewably committed to agency
discretion unless the relevant statute is "drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply." '53 The animating principle of this doctrine
is that, where Congress gave courts no way to assess agency action-i.e., to
engage in meaningful judicial review, there Congress did not intend for courts
to be involved at all. 54 In view of the presumption in favor of reviewability,
the set of cases where courts have no role to play and "no law to apply" is now
understood to be small. 55
Where to find a judicial role or manageable standard, meanwhile, goes

151. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985). See also Levin, supranote 135, at 691.
How much of this tradition, particularly pre-APA precedent, courts should use when
determining whether an action is "committed to agency discretion" is contested, especially
whether courts ought to make this determination in common-law fashion. 5 U.S.C. 701 (a)(2);
see also Gillian E. Metzger, EmbradngAdministrativeCommon Law, 80 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 1293
(2012) (arguing that the common law approach has persisted and, indeed, is both institutionally
desirable and constitutionally sound); see generalyJohn F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in
Judidal Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1998) (offering an extensive historical discussion and
identifying a trend away from a common law method to a statutory method in the law
governing judicial review of agency actions).
152. CHARLES H. KOCH,JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, 4 ADMIN. L. & PRAC.
12:12-13 (3d
ed. 2018).
153. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971) (citing S.Rep.
No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)) (internal quotations omitted).
154. See KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 152, at 12:12.
155. Overron Park, 401 U.S. at 410; Heckler,470 U.S. at 830 (reiterating and quoting from
Overron Park). The Court in Overton Park did recognize that the scope of 701(a)(2) had
previously been "the subject of extensive commentary." 401 U.S. at 410 n.23 (citing leading
scholarly articles by Professors Raoul Berger, Harvey Saferstein, and Kenneth Culp Davis).
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beyond the statutory text alone and often includes legislative history1"' or the
overall statutory scheme.15 Such evidence is surely most likely to be compelling
if Congress places it in the statutory text.158 Nevertheless, the ability to look to
the overall framework that Congress has enacted is a sensible parallel to the
Court's related instruction for evaluating preclusion statutes under 701 (a)(1),
to find "clear and convincing" indications159 that are " 'fairly discernible' in the
detail of the legislative scheme,"16 not solely in the statutory text.

Somewhat surprisingly, law to apply that is manageable enough to enable
judicial review may come even from the agency itself, i.e., from the agency's
own regulation,1" 1 and at least one circuit court decision has inferred adequate
law to apply from an agency's "established policies." '162 This is surprising
because it seems to put the legitimacy of judicial review at least partly into the
hands of the agency that would be subject to review, which would seem to be
in tension with the separation of powers.
This is not to overstate the point: at most, the agency's regulation or
established policy would be a sufficient condition for judicial review, not a
necessary one. In other words, the agency could not insulate itself where
Congress had intended review to be available, but could expose itself to review
though Congress apparently committed the action to the agency's discretion.
Still, allowing courts to look inside an agency for law to apply is of potential
concern because promulgating clear, manageable regulations and policies may
expose an agency to review where it would otherwise be insulated. Such a
scenario is likely to arise only when the legislative materials-text, history,
etc.-suggest unreviewability, leaving courts with only the agency's own
156. See, e.g.,
Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1452-53 (10th Cir. 1994).

157. See, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Meese, 891 F.2d 1374,
1379-80 (9th Cir. 1989).
158. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 615-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Justice
Scalia ultimately disagreed with the Court's holding that the firing of former CIA employee
John Doe was reviewable for constitutional defects, he agreed with the Court's more general
analysis about commitment to agency discretion. By that analysis, the statute granting the
Director of Central Intelligence discretion to fire any employee did suggest that Congress had
committed such firings to the CIA's discretion under 701(a) (2). Indeed, for Justice Scalia the
text was conclusive, making it "difficult to conceive of a statutory scheme that more clearly
reflects that 'commit[ment] to agency discretion by law' to which 701 (a)(2) refers." Id. at 616.
159. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
160. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 350 (1984) (emphasis added).
161. Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Baldrige, 827 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir.
1987).
162. Socop-Gonzalez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 208 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir.
2000). Although the Ninth Circuit subsequently reheard the case en banc, the order granting
en banc review did not vacate the panel decision but merely spoke to its precedential value
within the circuit. See Socop-Gonzalez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 229 F.3d 860
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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practices to consider.
The potential chilling effect that this type of agency-based judicial search
for law to apply may have upon clear agency rule-making and policy-making is
underscored by two things. One is the inter-circuit consensus it appears to
command, with support from decisions in the First,163 Third, 164 Sixth, 165
Seventh, 166 Eighth, 16 ' Ninth, 61 8' Tenth, 169 and D.C. 0 Circuits. The other is
Supreme Court dicta that even an agency's unfettered discretion may, through
the agency's own practice, subsequently be constrained so forbid the agency
to make an "irrational departure" from that practice. 1 1 This chilling effect is
not merely an academic concern but already appears to be manifesting in
Patent Office resistance to calls for clarity in certain parts of its decision
making apparatus that are questionable and otherwise potentially
unreviewable.
C.

ACTIONS REVIEWABLE WITH DEFERENCE

Whereas the preceding discussion has set out the conditions under which
courts give absolute deference to agency actions by abstaining from judicial
review, the more common understanding of deference is review that
affirmatively evaluates agency action and leaves it intact even if the reviewing
court itself might have reached a different outcome. Some of the doctrinal
163. See Mass. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 852
F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the Commission's decision is not reviewable because
there is no meaningful standard for review in agency regulations).
164. See Chong v. Dir., U.S. Info. Agency, 821 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that
judicial review is available for the Agency's decision because there is "law to apply" as set forth
in the agency's regulations).
165. See Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 790 (6t Cir. 1991) (holding that judicial
review is available because there are standards guiding the agency action and the judicial review
of the action).
166. See Head Start Family Educ. Program, Inc. v. Coop. Educ. Serv. Agency 11, 46 F.3d
629, 632-33 (7t Cir. 1995) (holding that judicial review is available partly because there is
ample "law to apply" in administrative regulations).
167. See Madsen v. Dep't of Agric., 866 F.2d 1035, 1037 (8t Cir. 1989) (holding that
exception for judicial reviewability only applies when there is "no law to apply," and that the
Department's regulation at issue does not meet such a standard).
168. See Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Baldrige, 827 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9t Cir.
1987) (holding that the Department's regulation provides "law to apply" and therefore is
reviewable).
169. SeeThomas Brooks Chartered v. Burnett, 920 F.2d 634, 642 (10t Cir. 1990) (holding
that affirmative agency action is reviewable where the agency purports to act pursuant to its
own rules).
170. See CC Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 146, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding
that the Department's decision is reviewable because regulations promulgated by an
administrative agency in carrying out its statutory mandate are reviewable).
171. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 31-32 (1996).
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focus is accordingly different, but important parallels remain. Discussion of
these details is the final administrative law premise needed for understanding
recursive deference.
For actions reviewable with deference, the governing framework is
foundationally identified with the Court's 1984 Chevron decision."12 By its
familiar two-step test, Chevron instructs that when an agency interprets an
ambiguous statute, courts must uphold the agency interpretation if it is
reasonable.1" Thus, step one is to ask whether the statutory provision that the
agency has interpreted is ambiguous or, instead, Congress has "directly spoken
to the precise question at issue." ' If the statutory provision is, indeed,
ambiguous, then step two is to ask whether the agency's chosen interpretation
reflects "a permissible construction of the statute." " Where the choice
"represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency's care by the statute," the court should uphold it.1"6
The agency's interpretation need not be the only permissible construction, and
the agency's choice need not be what the court itself would have chosen.'
Even if both of these conditions are unmet, the court must still uphold the
agency's reasonable interpretation.
In addition to the content of Chevron itself, the court's jurisprudence on
deference to agency action also speaks, not without some conflict, to when the
Chevron analysis should apply at all. One form of this antecedent inquiry,
known as step zero, is to ask whether the agency enjoys power delegated
from Congress to interpret a statute that the agency administers or otherwise
to "speak with the force of law."1 If the agency does not, or has not exercised
that power, then the reviewing court will not give the strong deference of
Chevron.180 The other form is to ask whether the subject of the agency action is
an issue so important-a so-called "major question"18 1 that it would be

172. See Sunstein, supra note 108, at 188.
173.

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
at 842.
Id.
at 843.
Id.
at 845 (internal citations omitted).
See id.
at 843 n.11.
SeegeneraL'y Sunstein, supra note 108; see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 108, at

836.

179. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002) (upholding the agency regulation in
question because the enabling statute "delegate[d] to the Agency considerable authority to fill
in, through interpretation, matters of detail related to its administration"); United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (explaining that "Congress not only engages in express
delegation of specific interpretative authority," but also delegates implicitly).
180. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35.
181. See Sunstein, supra note 108, at 236-42. A recent, and particularly contentious,
example of the major question doctrine was the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in King v.
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implausible to infer a Congressional delegation of lawmaking power to the
agency as to that issue.182 Where the agency action does implicate such a major
question, the court, again, will not give the strong deference of Chevron.183 The
court may still accord the agency more modest deference in proportion to the
"persuasive force" of the agency's reasoning,18 4 but that is all.
Where Chevron deference is concerned, Congressional intent remains just
as essential as with statutes that command absolute deference to agency actions
either by precluding review under 701 (a)(1) or by committing actions to the
agency's discretion under 701 (a) (2). The difference is that preclusion statutes
turn on Congressional intent to withhold review,18 5 and commitment to agency
discretion generally turns on Congressional intent to withhold any "law to
' For Chevron, the Congressional
apply."186
intent in question is the intent to
delegate authority to the agency to "speak with the force of law." 18 7To the
extent that this delegation is lacking, the agency will receive little or no
deference.188
Like Congressional intent, also still essential to deferential review is proper
respect for the separation of powers and the rule of law, though in this context,
courts accord that respect differently. Under the Chenegy doctrine, courts affirm
or reject agency actions based only on the agency's own reasons rather than
Burwe. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). The Court in Bunve& upheld the permissibility of healthcare
subsidies under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) for individuals purchasing insurance on a
federal insurance exchange even though the language of the ACA referred to exchanges
established by states. Id. at 2496. The Court was evaluating the IRS interpretation of that
language and, rather than defer to the IRS, held that the question presented was of such
"economic and political significance" that deference could not be justified. Id. at 2488-89.
Instead, the Court evaluated the IRS's position essentially de novo and ultimately found it
satisfactory. Id.
182. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (explaining
that "Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while
leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute's daily
administration') (citing Stephen Breyer, JudidalRebiew ofQuestions ofLaw and Po1 y, 38 ADMIN.
L. REv. 363, 370 (1986)).
183. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994).
184. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 235. The alterative, lesser form of deference was first articulated
by the Court in Skidmore v.Swilft & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
185. See supranotes 133-134 and accompanying text.
186. See supranotes 153-155 and accompanying text.
187. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
188. Further, and more basically, to the extent that the doctrine of implied delegation
recedes under current criticisms and proposed legislative reforms, agencies may receive
systematically less deference not because Chevron is unsatisfied but because it is simply less
potent. See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, H.R. 76, 115th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2017) (abrogating Chevron and requiring courts to review all agency interpretation of statutory
ambiguity de novo); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 76, 114th Cong., 2d
Sess. (2016) (same). The merits of these proposals are outside the scope of this Article.
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on alternate reasons supplied by the reviewing court, for "[t]o do so would
propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for
the administrative agency. 1 89 These agency rationales and arguments are what
the reviewing court considers-and all that it considers-when deciding
whether an agency interpretation is reasonable.1 9 That is, an agency cannot
prevail at Chevron step two without satisfying Cheney.1 91
Thus, courts contemplating deferential review under Chevron preserve the
separation of powers by stepping back and abstaining from crafting policy
justifications that are properly for the agency to craft. By contrast, courts that
are contemplating absolute deference to agencies via Z701(a)-style
unreviewability tend to preserve the separation of powers by stepping forward
as guardians of individual relief against unchecked agency power. And across
the spectrum of judicial review and judicial deference as to agency actions
discussed to this point, courts protect the rule of law by requiring the agency
under Cheney to articulate its reasoning, whether to defend the reasonableness
of its actions under Chevron or to show that its actions are not an abuse of
discretion even where review is otherwise unavailable under 701 (a).
This is significant because Cheney is applicable only where, and to the
extent that, judicial review is available. 192 The doctrine cannot subject an
otherwise unreviewable agency action to judicial review.1 93 This is certainly
consonant with Cheney's place in Chevron step two, for Chevron itself cannot
apply unless judicial review is already available. But as with preclusion statues
that command absolute deference to an agency action, the level of generality
at which the agency's action is to be considered also matters for deference
under Chevron and reasoned decision making under Cheney.
For example, a court that were concerned about an agency's abuse of
power might require the agency to give a more extensive account of its decision
making by conceptualizing the disputed agency action more broadly. The
operation of Cheney would remain unchanged, but its effect would be enlarged.
Likewise, if the same court and agency labored under a preclusion statute that
accorded absolute deference to one agency action but potentially left a second,

189. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).

190. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001); Am.'s Cmty.
Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
191. See Amy R. Motomura, Rethinking Administrative Law's Chenery Doctfne: Lessons from
Patent Appeals at the FederalCircuit, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 817, 872 (2014); Kevin M. Stack,
The ConstitutionalFoundations ofChenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 1005 (2007).
192. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283
(1987) (explaining that Chenegy "pertains to the basis that a court may use for the affirmance of
ageng action that is reviewable'D.
193. Id. (explaining further that "Chenegy has nothing whatever to do with whether agency
action is reviewable").
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related agency action untouched, then the court might conceptualize the first
(insulated) agency action narrowly and the second (reviewable) agency action
broadly in order to maximize the degree to which the court could demand
reasoning through Chene and modulate its deference through Chevron, or even
Skidmore.
D.

THE PROBLEM OF RECURSIVE DEFERENCE

Recursive deference is a phenomenon in which these forms of absolute
and non-absolute judicial deference combine to produce a more complex
judicial inquiry. The simple case of recursive deference is a single agency action
that would ordinarily be a candidate for Chevron deference but which may be
unreviewable, i.e., may warrant absolute deference. This situation is
functionally no different from a Chevron step zero inquiry. The action either is
or is not "the type of agency action that merits deference" under Cevron,,94 so
Chevron either does or does not apply.
The nontrivial case, now observable in the shifting power dynamics
between the Patent Office and the federal courts, is that of two interrelated
agency actions-one of which may warrant Chevron deference and the other of
which is purportedly unreviewable. Depending on how broad the scope of
unreviewability is for the latter agency action and how closely related the two
actions are, the first agency action may or may not receive Chevron deference.
This analytical framework does much to explain the PTAB's piecemeal
rejection of grounds that it considers redundant. Under CuozjZo, the institution
decision itself is unreviewable. 9 5 Meanwhile, the related, underlying choice to
institute petitions in part rather than in full is at least arguably ambiguous. 96
This connection between the first insulated agency action (institution) and the
second, related agency action (partial institution) could lead to multiple
possible outcomes. One is that institution as such may be defined broadly, with
partial institution merely a lesser-included power. On this view, the preclusive
scope of 314(d) or 324(e) insulates partial institution as well, and the
agency's Chevron obligation to show the reasonableness of its regulation is moot
because the unavailability of judicial review forecloses any Chene inquiry at
Chevron step two. Another possible outcome is that the decision whether to
institute is merely a binary threshold choice whereas the scope of PTAB review
is an analytically distinct issue. On this view, an agency obligation under Chenegy
to explain its reasoning is viable because the power of partial institutionwhether its statutory grounding is ambiguous or not is judicially reviewable.

194.
States v.
195.
196.

Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1571 (2007) (citing United
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001)).
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016).
See supranotes 109-111 and accompanying text.
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Thus, in practice, when determining whether an agency action merits
deference, the recursion to see whether it is related enough to a second,
unreviewable, agency action such that both may be unreviewable can be
considered an intermediate step between step zero and step one.19 If the type
of deference in question is Chevron, the relevant agency action must not only
reflect a delegation by Congress of authority to interpret the statute or
otherwise speak with the force of law.198 The agency action must also fall
outside the sweep of a second, related agency action that is unreviewable.
IV.

RESOLUTION AND FUTURE PROBLEMS

Since the Patent Office practice of redundancy-based rejections came to
the fore, two of the underlying open questions of PTAB structure have been
resolved. The PTAB has also responded to criticism of its opaque decision
making by scaling back its rejection of redundant grounds, though this trend
is more ambiguous. Still, the larger structural concern articulated by Judge
Reyna in Shaw Industies, 99 that the Patent Office will claim unreviewable
discretion and the public will have little or no guidance on what boundaries
the Federal Circuit is prepared to impose on these claims, still persists. In short,
the problem of redundant grounds may resurface, and other similar problems
may arise.

A.

STRUCTURAL GUIDANCE ON PARTIAL INSTITUTION

The first open question of PTAB structure that has now been resolved is
that of adjudicating petitions piecemeal at the institution stage rather than fully
granting or fully denying review. In SAS Institute v. Iancu, the Supreme Court
this past Term held that the statute does not permit partial institution on a
claim-by-claim basis. 0 A reasonable likelihood of eventual success on the
merits of the petition201 means "only that the Director can decide 'whether' to
institute the requested review-not 'whether and to what extent' review should

proceed." ' 2 In other words, the Court rejected the theory that the PTAB's
discretionary power to institute carries with it a lesser-included power to select
a subset of challenged patent claims on which to proceed with review.2 3

197. See supranotes 172-178 and accompanying text.
198. See supranotes 178-180 and accompanying text.
199. See supranotes 101-102 and accompanying text.
200. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (2018).
201. Although this is the institution criterion for inter partes review, see 35 U.S.C. 314(a)
(2012), the Court's logic would likely apply with equal force to the institution criterion for
post-grant review and covered business method review under 324(a).
202. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1356.
203. See supranote 110 and accompanying text.
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As a result, the Patent Office regulation providing for partial institution..4
is, at least to the extent of choosing among patent claims, invalid as contrary
to statute. It is as yet unclear whether the remainder of that regulation, which
also provides for instituting review upon certain patent claims on certaingrounds,
has survived SAS Institute.
For the time being, the Patent Office is not leaving much to chance. In
guidance issued two days after the decision in SAS Institute, the agency
announced that it would henceforth institute on all patent claims in a petition
(or none at all), as well as on all challenges in the petition (or none at all).205 In
both the guidance document itself and in a subsequent "Chat with the Chief"
held by PTAB Chief Judge David Ruschke, the agency stated its view that SAS
Institute requires a binary decision only as to all patent claims challenged in the
petition, not as to all challenges raised in the petition.2 6 The PTAB leadership
is showing an abundance of caution but reserving for itself the right to change
course later.
As a matter of agency policy, this is entirely sensible. Several hundred inter
partes reviews are currently pending in the PTAB, and, of these, the agency
estimates that close to a fifth were instituted piecemeal.20 These pending cases
must now also be brought into compliance, and a broadly precautionary stance
by the agency is likely to serve as a strong signal to litigants about the changing
landscape of incentives in PTAB adjudication.2 8 In the context of pending
cases, the effect of such signaling may be, in many cases, to encourage
resolution of the statutory deficiency by the parties themselves, e.g., through
20 9
joint termination of the inter partes review.
Nevertheless, as a matter of the legislative policy balance that Congress

204. 37 C.F.R.

42.108 (a) (2018).

205. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Guidance on the Impact ofSAS onALA TrialProceedigs,
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appealboard/ trials /guidance-impact-s as -aia-trial [https://perma.cc/VG82-HKPlK].
206. See id. (describing adjudication of claims as "required by the [SAS] decision" while
limiting the policy on adjudication of challenge to "[a]t this time"); U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, CHAT WITH THE CHIEF ON SAS

[hereinafter CHIEF

CHAT],

(Apr. 30,

2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/chat with-chief sas
5.3.18.pdf [https://perna.cc/UUC6-HJ79] (same).
207. CHIEF CHAT, supra note 206 (stated orally during the question-and-answer period);
see Saurabh Vishnubhakat (@emptydoors), TWITTER (Apr. 30, 2018 9:23 AM),
https://twitter.com/emptydoors/status/990990143799558144
[https://perma.cc/58Q5RFRP] (contemporaneously live-tweeting the statistic).
208. Seegenera'ly Saurabh Vishnubhakat, FirstStepsAfter SAS Institute, PATENTLY-O (Apr.
27, 2018), www.patentlyo.com/patent/2018/04/ first- steps-institute.html [https://perma.cc/
8Q68-EAJ2] (discussing litigant incentives as well as Patent Office incentives for pending as
well as future cases following SAS Institute).
209. See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. 317(a) (2012).
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struck in the AIA itself, the agency's desire to preserve its options means that
the ability to reject redundant grounds-or, indeed, to claim other new forms
of discretion under the cover of unreviewable power over institutions-may
yet return.
B.

STRUCTURAL GUIDANCE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

The second open question of PTAB structure that has now been resolved
is that of unreviewability itself. The resolution is not complete: the courts have
not said, nor would likely purport to say, where any bright line lies between
the unreviewable power over institution and reviewable powers over related0
21
matters. But the en banc Federal Circuit in Wi-Fi One LLC v. Broadcom Corp.
and the Supreme Court in SAS Institute have both recognized important limits
on the exceedingly broad mandate that the Patent Office took from Cuo.Zo
about unreviewable agency discretion. It was this very mandate, in fact, on
which the agency rested its expansive position in Shaw Industries about
"complete discretion to deny institution" without "even hav[ing] to state in
our institution decisions why we're choosing not to go forward. 21 1
The issue presented in Wi-Fi One was whether the one-year deadline from
the filing of an infringement lawsuit, within which a petition for inter partes
review must be brought, 212 is susceptible to ordinary judicial review.213 The
Patent Office had previously argued-and a panel of the Federal Circuit had
agreed in Achates Reference Publishing v.Apple214-that the PTAB's application of
this one-year time bar was merely incidental to its general power over
institution, and was therefore unreviewable. 215 Notably, this broad view of
agency discretion preceded the Supreme Court's June 2016 decision in Cuo.Zo
but did rest on the Federal Circuit's own panel decision in Cuo.Zo, 216which the
Supreme Court ultimately approved.2 1
One of the most important intervening changes between Achates and WiFi One was the Patent Office's ascendant series of litigation positions regarding

210. 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
211. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1303 (2016)
(Reyna, J., concurring).
212. See 35 U.S.C.
315(b) (2012) (providing that "inter partes review may not be
instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on
which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint
alleging infringement of the patent").

213. Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1367.
214. 803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
215. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
216. In iv Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
217. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (affirming the
judgment of the Federal Circuit).
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judicial unreviewability. 218 The impact of these positions was forcefully
articulated in Judge Reyna's separate opinion in Shaw Industries219 but arose in
other contexts as well. For example, in Knowles Electronics v. Mata, the Federal
Circuit panel ordered additional briefing on whether the Patent Office was
required separately to show its own Article III standing to exercise its statutory
power to intervene on appeal where one of the litigants was absent from the
appeal (in fact, the litigant whose position the agency was espousing).22 In fact,
there is good reason to think the Patent Office does have this obligation,
especially in light of its strategic, policy-oriented pattern of deciding when to
intervene. 1 The agency, however, again took a highly expansive view on each
successive question in the supplemental briefing order: the Patent Office need
not separately show its own Article III standing; if it did, such standing existed
in the case at bar; and regardless, the agency is free to take any position on
appeal that it wants. 222 Given this persistent pattern of agency selfaggrandizement, the strong and clear deceleratory outcome in Wi-Fi One is a
welcome reversal.223
So, too, is the Supreme Court's consensus in SAS Institute that the question
of partial institution is plainly reviewable notwithstanding Cuo.Zo. The decision
as a whole was split 5-4, with Justice Gorsuch writing for the majority224 and
Justice Breyer writing the principal dissent for the remaining justices. 225 The
majority held that the text of the institution standard in 314(a) was
unambiguous and that the agency's argument for deference failed at Chevron

218. SeegeneraLy Vishnubhakat, supranote 114 (arguing that the series of positions that the
Patent Office has taken on judicial unreviewability under 314(d) reflects systematic
encroachments by the agency on judicial powers that the AIA left undisturbed, and that these
encroachments have weakened the emergent court-agency border in patent law under the
AIA).

219. See supranotes 101-102 and accompanying text.
220. See Knowles Elecs., LLC v. Matal, No. 16-1954 (Fed Cir. June 30, 2017) (per curiam)
(order requesting supplemental briefing), https://cdn.patentlyo.com/media/2017/06/
KnowlesOrder.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VXQ-LHK2].
221. See generaL'y Saurabh Vishnubhakat, When Can the Patent Office Intervene in Its Own Cases?,
73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201 (2018); see also Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Mapping the Patent
Office Intervenor Power, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 5, 2018), www.patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02
/mapping-patent-intervenor.html [https://perma.cc/9288-DBX5].
222. See Supplemental Brief for Intervenor, Knowles Elecs., LLC v. Matal, No. 16-1954
(Fed. Cir. July 31, 2017), 2017 WL 3399631, at *1-2.
223. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 114, at 1087-91 (discussing the jurisprudential effects

of Wi-Fi One).
224. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1352 (2018).
225. See id. at 1360 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg wrote a brief dissent that the
other dissenting justices also joined, but the detailed rejoinder to the majority was Justice
Breyer's.
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step one. Importantly, and apropos of the recursive deference inquiry, the
majority also held that the antecedent question, even before Chevron, of
whether partial institution is authorized by statute is not closely tied to the
binary power of the PTAB over institutions. 2
Meanwhile, Justice Breyer's dissent held that the institution standard of
314(a) was, indeed, ambiguous and that the resolution of that ambiguity by a
Patent Office rule intended to streamline administrative adjudication-by
focusing the parameters of the dispute through partial institution-was
reasonable. 228 Even to reach the Chevron inquiry, however, Justice Breyer had
to do the same thing the majority did: conclude that the issue was susceptible
of judicial review. The majority saw no need to evaluate the agency's policy
reasoning for reasonableness, and the dissent both made the evaluation and
found it satisfactory. But the entire Court implicitly agreed that the Chevron
inquiry itself was viable because the agency's underlying action was not
insulated from judicial oversight altogether. Just as Wi-Fi One does, SAS
Institute represents a significant limit on the reach of Cuo.Zo and the ability of
the Patent Office to rely on that precedent for broad claims to unchecked
discretion.
The upshot of these judicial resolutions for the structure of the PTAB is
that the early and expansive Patent Office position on rejecting redundant
grounds without defense or even explanation is probably not tenable anymore.
Still, a more modest reformulation of that practice remains possible, as do new
claims of agency power.
C.

CONTRACTION OF REDUNDANT-GROUNDS ANALYSIS

The tide of the non-doctrine of redundancy appears now to be ebbing.
Since the practice of rejecting otherwise meritorious grounds piecemeal for
being redundant first arose, primarily in covered business method reviews, it
has been deployed in over 700 institution decisions on petitions for inter partes
review from March 2013, when the first institution decisions began to issue,
through July 2017.229As Figure 1 shows, the monthly volume of institution
decisions that relied on redundancy-based filtering rose quickly through 2013
and reached a high-water mark in 2014, receding thereafter to relatively modest
monthly levels from late 2015 onward.

226. See id. at 1358-59 (majority opinion).
227. See id. at 1359.
228. See id. at 1364 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
229. Data on institution and rejections of redundant grounds is from the Docket
Navigator service. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, supra note 27.
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Figure 1: Institution Decisions in Inter Partes Review Rejecting Redundant Grounds
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It is ambiguous, however, what the source of this ebb actually is. One
plausible explanation is that the agency itself has responded to the raft of
criticism about the ill effects of its redundancy-based rejections, such as
prejudice from estoppel, 3 ' and the skepticism about the agency's authority to
engage in the practice at all. For all that the Patent Office has done since the
AIA to enlarge its autonomy relative to the supervisory power of the Federal
Circuit, it remains an institution that is, politically speaking, impressively
sensitive to input from its various public constituencies.Y
Also plausible, however, is that the decline in rejections of redundant
grounds simply reflects a decline in the assertion by petitioners of grounds that
the PTAB would find redundant. In other words, the agency may not be
staying its hand at all. Litigants may simply be learning. Descriptive statistics,
meanwhile, are not enough to disentangle cause and effect in this regard.
Ultimately, however, both accounts are problematic for the same reason.
If the agency is exercising restraint today, it may reverse course tomorrow, and
if litigants are learning today, their lessons are always at the mercy of the
agency's self-styled discretion. Mechanisms do exist for the Patent Office to
create credible and durable checks on its own ability to change course in this
regard, as in others, but thus far it has not done so.
The most straightforward way would be to identify an institution decision
of the PTAB that articulates a coherent-and, ideally, judicially ratified-view
of redundant grounds and designate that PTAB opinion precedentialY' In the
230. See, e.g, Bob High, Comment, Redundant Prior Art References and Their PrejudicialEffects
on Post-Issuance Reiew Petitioners, 65 EMoRY L.J. 581 (2015) (arguing that petitioners would be
prejudiced by being "forced to assert a ground of unpatentability that turns out to be weaker
than grounds declared redundant" while estoppel would attach as to both grounds).
231. See generaLjy Saurabh Vishnubhakat, DisguisedPatent Poligmaking, 104 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (discussing the political valence of Patent Office decision making under
the AIA, which has been relatively obscured by the dominant narrative of the agency's
technical expertise).

232. See generaLly Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Precedent and Process in the Patent Trial and Appeal
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hierarchy of PTAB designations, "representative opinions are a descriptive
curation of routine opinions. Informative opinions go beyond merely
surveying an issue and synthesize some further normative guidance.
'
Precedential opinions go further still and make the synthesis binding."233
Departure from an opinion designated precedential would require
supersession by binding authority, such as a Federal Circuit decision or a
contrary redesignation,23 4 akin to reversing the policy of agency rulemaking
either by judicial invalidation or by expending the political and material cost of
a second rulemaking.
Instead, the PTAB points to only one opinion as having any guidance value
at all on redundant grounds: Liberty Mutual v. Progressive Casualy, a 2012
institution decision that came well before either the systemic effects of
redundancy-based screening came to the fore or the agency's troubled quest
for judicially unreviewable discretion unfolded.235 Presently, Liberty Mutual
holds the least authoritative PTAB designation, that of "Other Representative
Orders and Decisions. ' ' 236

Instead of this equivocal contraction by the agency, the greater check on
agency practice with respect to redundant grounds seems to have been
imposed externally, by the Federal Circuit. In CRFD Research v. Mata, the
PTAB declined to institute review on an argument by petitioner Hulu that
patent owner CRFD's patent was obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103 in view of a
prior art patent issued to inventor Bates. 23 Hulu argued that CRFD's patent
was obvious not only in light of Bates alone but also in light of the combination
of Bates with other patents.238 The PTAB granted review on the latter
argument but rejected as redundant the argument of obviousness in light of
Bates alone.239

However, rather than deferring to agency discretion as it had done in Shaw
Industries and other cases, the Federal Circuit in CRFD Research held that the
Board, PATENTLY-O (May 10, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/05/precedentprocess-patent.html [https://perna.cc/KV7M-S7VN] (describing Patent Office Standard
Operating Procedure No. 2 for designating opinions as "representative," "informative," or
"precedential' .
233. Id.
234. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE No. 2 3, (Rev. 9, Sept. 22, 2014).
235. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Co., No. CBM2012-0003, at 2 (P.T.A.B.
Oct. 25, 2012).
236. Representative Orders, Decisions, and Notces, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process /appealing-patent-decisions/decisionsand-opinions/representative-orders [https://perma.cc/Z2P7-TADE].
237. See CRFD Research, Inc. v. Matal, 876 F.3d 1330, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
238. See id. at 1346.
239.

See id.
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PTAB erred and that its redundancy-based rejection was both reviewable and,
in the case at bar, improper. 40 The court explained:
To bar Hulu from pressing an argument it raised in a ground the Board
found "redundant" and that it expressly incorporated into other
proposed grounds of unpatentability on which the Board instituted
would not only unfairly prejudice Hulu, but would also raise questions
241
about the propriety of the Board's redundancy decision.
Like the recent judicial guidance on partial institution and judicial review,242
this concern for unfair prejudice against the petitioner and interrogation of the
propriety of rejecting grounds as redundant is new in the PTAB's experience
and a welcome reversal of past leniencies.
V.

CONCLUSION

The trajectory of the Patent Office experiment with attempting to manage
its docket by rejecting grounds for redundancy is a stark case study in the
sensitivity of administrative adjudication to early structural choices and
persistent enlargements of agency power. The agency's diversely applied but
coherently revealed preference for claiming broad discretion under the
nonappealability provisions of 314(d) and 324(e) was built on a number of
analytical premises. One was that the agency could sweep more and more of
its adjudication-related actions, which are susceptible to ordinary judicial
review, into the ambit of its screening-related actions, which are immune from
review. This was plausible, at least initially, because the standard for screening
overlapped significantly with merits adjudication itself by inquiring into the
likelihood of eventual success in the case. This view was ultimately vindicated
in Cuo.Z.o and did much of the doctrinal work for Patent Office claims of
discretion.
Another premise was that the PTAB could properly create for itself by
regulation the authority to make partial institutions. This, too, was initially
plausible because the institution statute could be read as ambiguous and thus
within the purview of Chevron deference. This view ultimately failed in SAS
Institute, which also laid down an important limit on the logic and reach of
Cuoz.zo.
In the end, however, the glue that held the syllogism together for so long
was the Patent Office's reliance on the recursive relationship between judicial
deference to its interpretation of the institution statute and the antecedent

240. See id.
241. Id.

242. See supra Sections IV.A-IV.B.
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availability of judicial review of actions related, whether closely or distantly, to
institution. The positions of the Patent Office reflected, quite early in the
history of the AIA, a recognition that even if Chevron deference could not be
had, the Cheneg obligation of reason-giving at step two of Chevron presupposed
reviewability. If that reviewability could be argued away, the end result would
be the same: autonomy for the agency, free from oversight by the Federal
Circuit.
This last insight has only just begun to see daylight in the Federal Circuit's
case law. The rejection in CRFD Research of a redundant-grounds approach
suggests that the court may be willing to look beyond its initial approbations
of the PTAB's discretion and hold the PTAB more accountable for its
obligations of reasoned decision making and transparency, virtues that are
often tempting to compromise in the pursuit of efficiency and the lure of
technocratic expertise. The agency's own drawdown of rejecting redundant
grounds is encouraging but ambiguous and easily reversible. Latent potential
remains for the problem to return and for new claims of agency power to arise
in the same vein. In this setting of disequilibrium between the courts and the
Patent Office, as the system of AIA proceedings continues to mature, the work
of the judiciary in disciplining agency excess is not yet complete.

